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Abstract
We consider the problem of assigning students to schools on the basis of
priorities. Students are allowed to have equal priority at a school. We char-
acterize the eﬃcient rules which weakly/strongly respect students’ priorities.
When priority orderings are not strict, it is not possible to simply break ties in
a ﬁxed manner. All possibilities of resolving the indiﬀerences need to be con-
sidered. Neither the deferred acceptance algorithm nor the top trading cycle
algorithm successfully solve the problem of eﬃciently assigning the students to
schools whereas a modiﬁed version of the deferred acceptance algorithm might.
In this version tie breaking depends on students’ preferences.
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1 Introduction
Until the 1990s children were assigned to public schools in the district where their
parents live in. Rich families could choose the district where their children will go
to school by moving to that district. Poor families did not have this choice. Since
“better” public schools are often located in richer neighborhoods, children from poor
families did not have access to those schools. This inequality of opportunity between
rich and poor families triggered U.S. cities to establish centralized interdistrict school
choice programs. Such a program oﬀers students (or children) the possibility to
be admitted at schools which are not located in the district in which they live. It
assigns students to schools (or universities) on the basis of priorities and students’ (or
parents’) preferences. A school’s priority ordering represents the rights students have
to be admitted at that school and is based on observed characteristics of students
or an entry exam. For example, the city of Boston determines the priority ordering
of a school as follows (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003): ﬁrst priority is given to
students who live within walking distance from the school and already have a sibling
attending the school; second priority is given to students who have a sibling attending
the school; third priority is given to students who live within walking distance from
the school; and fourth priority is given to all other students. Any two students with
the same characteristics have equal priority. Priorities are ﬁxed because they are
obtained through an objective test or by law. The only criteria for eﬃciency and
strategic manipulation of rules are students’ preferences. Several authors1 consider
a special case of this problem where schools’ priority orderings are strict. In real
applications, however, priority orderings are rarely strict. It has been argued that if
a priority ordering is not strict, one can simply break ties randomly to obtain a strict
priority ordering. We will show that this approach is short-sighted. When priority
orderings are not strict, we need to consider all possible resolutions of indiﬀerences
1See Balinski and So¨nmez (1999), Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (1999, 2003), Ergin (2002), and
Kesten (2006).
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in a priority ordering. Students having equal priorities at a school are then ordered
in both ways.
The following is an intuitively appealing principle for rules to follow students’
priorities: if student i has higher priority than student j at school a, then it should
not be the case that student i envies student j because student j was admitted by
school a. We say that an assignment of the students to the schools weakly respects
the priority orderings of the schools if such a violation does not occur. Likewise a rule
weakly respects the priority orderings of the schools if for any students’ preferences the
assignment chosen by the rule weakly respects the priority orderings of the schools.
For strict priority orderings Balinski and So¨nmez (1999) and Ergin (2002) use the
deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm with students proposing2 to assign students to
schools. The DA-algorithm weakly respects the strict priority orderings of the schools
and is Pareto superior to any other rule which weakly respects the strict priority
orderings of the schools. Unfortunately the DA-algorithm does not break ties and is
not deﬁned for weak priority orderings.
When students are allowed to have equal priorities, there is another natural prin-
ciple for rules to follow students’ priorities: if student i has at least the same priority
as student j at school a, then it should not be the case that student i envies student
j because student j was admitted by school a. This principle is especially important
when ties are broken randomly: a tie may be broken either way and each of the
students may be ranked higher than the other. A priori both tied students have the
same priority and when breaking the tie either way, in the strict resolution each of the
tied students may have higher priority than the other. Similarly as above we say that
a rule strongly respects the priority orderings of the schools if such a violation does
not occur for any students’ preferences. Our ﬁrst result shows that if an eﬃcient rule
strongly respects the priority orderings of the schools, then the DA-algorithm yields
for all resolutions of indiﬀerences the same assignment. Then each school’s priority
2This algorithm is due to Gale and Shapley (1962).
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ordering is “essentially” strict and we may apply the DA-algorithm to any ﬁxed tie
breaking. However, these rules only strongly respect the priorities since they all yield
the same rule and tie breaking is not necessary. Our second result shows that if an
eﬃcient rule weakly respects the priority orderings of the schools, then for each proﬁle
there exists a resolution of indiﬀerences in schools’ priority orderings such that the
assignment chosen by the rule is obtained from applying the DA-algorithm to that
resolution. This result does not say that we can break ties exogenously and apply to
each proﬁle the DA-algorithm with the ﬁxed tie breaking.
Most rules which are used in real life have the ﬂaws that they are ineﬃcient and
manipulable. Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003) suggest two mechanisms for solving
the school choice problem with strict priority orderings. The ﬁrst mechanism is the
DA-algorithm and the second mechanism is a generalized version of Gale’s top trading
cycle algorithm, called “hierarchical exchange rule” (Pa´pai, 2000). The merits and
disadvantages of these mechanisms are the following: (1) The DA-algorithm weakly
respects the priority orderings of the schools but may be ineﬃcient. (2) A hierarchical
exchange rule is eﬃcient but may not weakly respect the priority orderings of the
schools. We show that neither approach successfully solves the school choice problem
when equal priorities are allowed. There are school choice problems such that (i) no
DA-algorithm (with ﬁxed tie breaking) is eﬃcient, (ii) no hierarchical exchange rule
weakly respects the priority orderings of the schools, and (iii) there exists an eﬃcient
and group strategy-proof rule which weakly respects the priority orderings of the
schools. The rule we propose is a modiﬁed version of the DA-algorithm in which ties
are broken endogenously, i.e. resolution of indiﬀerences in a priority ordering depends
on students’ preferences. This rule takes into account all possibilities of breaking ties.
2 The Model
Let N denote the set of students and A the set of schools. Each school a ∈ A has
a certain number of available positions, denoted by qa ∈ N. Sometimes we refer to
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qa as the quota of school a. Let q ≡ (qa)a∈A denote the list of quotas. Each student
is equipped with a preference relation Ri over A ∪ {i} where i stands for not being
assigned to any school. Let Pi denote the strict preference relation associated with
Ri. We assume that each student’s preference relation Ri is complete, transitive,
and antisymmetric, i.e. for all a, b ∈ A ∪ {i} such that a = b, aPib or bPia. A
(preference) proﬁle R is a list (Ri)i∈N . Given proﬁle R and M ⊆ N , let RM denote
the restriction of R to M . Let R denote the set of all proﬁles. In an assignment, each
student is assigned to a school or to no school, and the number of students who are
assigned to a school does not exceed its quota. Formally, an assignment is a function
μ : N → A ∪ N satisfying (i) for all i ∈ N , μ(i) ∈ A ∪ {i}, and (ii) for all a ∈ A,
|μ−1(a)| ≤ qa. Each school a has a (complete and transitive) priority ordering 
a
over the set of students. A priority structure 
 is a list (
a)a∈A. For all a ∈ A and
all i ∈ N , let Ua(i) ≡ {j ∈ N | j a i} denote the strict upper contour set of i at 
a
and Wa(i) ≡ {j ∈ N | j 
a i} the weak upper contour set of i at 
a. For all a ∈ A
and all N ′ ⊆ N , let 
a |N ′ denote the restriction of 
a to the set N ′.
An assignment problem (with a priority structure) (or school choice problem) is a
quintuple (N,A, (qa)a∈A, R,
). Because everything but R remains ﬁxed, an assign-
ment problem is simply a proﬁle R. A rule is a function mapping proﬁles to assign-
ments. A rule f is eﬃcient if for any proﬁle R there does not exist an assignment μ
which is Pareto superior to f(R), i.e. there is no μ such that for all i ∈ N , μ(i)Rifi(R),
and for some j ∈ N , μ(j)Pjfj(R). A rule f is strategy-proof if no student can gain
by misrepresentation, i.e. for all i ∈ N , all R ∈ R, and all R′i, fi(R)Rifi(RN\{i}, R′i).
A rule f is group strategy-proof if no group of students can gain by joint misrepre-
sentation, i.e. for all M ⊆ N , all R ∈ R, and all R′M = (R′i)i∈M , if for some i ∈ M ,
fi(R)Pifi(RN\M , R′M), then for some j ∈ M , fj(RN\M , R′M)Pjfj(R). A rule f has a
consistent extension if its choices involving diﬀerent school choice problems are co-
herent, i.e. for all M ⊆ N , all (RM , RN\M) ∈ R, and all R′N\M = (R′i)i∈N\M , if for all
a ∈ A, |{i ∈ N\M |fi(RM , RN\M) = a}| = |{i ∈ N\M |fi(RM , R′N\M) = a}|, then for
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all i ∈ M , fi(RM , RN\M) = fi(RM , R′N\M). A correspondence is a function mapping
proﬁles to non-empty sets of assignments. We say that a rule f is a selection from
correspondence F if for any proﬁle R, f(R) belongs to F (R).
Since we allow students to have equal priorities at a school, there are two principles
for rules to follow students’ priorities. These are the analogous deﬁnitions to strong
and weak core respectively and weak and strong blocking respectively.
The ﬁrst principle says that if a student is assigned to a certain school, then there
should be no student who both envies him and has at least the same priority to be
admitted at that school.
Deﬁnition 1 Let 
 be a priority structure and R ∈ R. The assignment μ weakly
violates the priority of i for a at μ if for some j ∈ N we have μ(j) = a, aPiμ(i), and
i 
a j. A rule f strongly respects 
 if for all proﬁles R ∈ R, f(R) does not weakly
violate any priorities.
The second principle says that if a student is assigned to a certain school, then
there should be no student who both envies him and has higher priority to be admitted
at that school.
Deﬁnition 2 Let 
 be a priority structure and R ∈ R. The assignment μ strongly
violates the priority of i for a at μ if for some j ∈ N , we have μ(j) = a, aPiμ(i), and
i a j. A rule f weakly respects 
 if for all proﬁles R ∈ R, f(R) does not strongly
violate any priorities.
Deﬁnitions 1 and 2 are equivalent when the priority ordering of each school is
strict. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst principle applies to school choice problems where ties
are broken randomly: a priori two tied students have the same priority and when
breaking the tie in either way, in the strict resolution each of the tied students may
have higher priority than the other.
The priority structure 
 represents ﬁxed preferences of the schools. A school’s
priority ordering was obtained through test scores of an entry exam or from observable
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characteristics of a student (such as the district where the student lives and whether
siblings of the student already attend the school). Grades of students on exams
often fall into a small number of discrete bins. If students are prioritized by grades,
this can lead to large indiﬀerence classes. Priority orderings are obtained through an
objective test and are thus irrelevant from a welfare perspective. Students’ preferences
are the only criteria for eﬃciency. Similarly students’ preferences evoke strategic
considerations whereas priority orderings do not.
Several authors have studied the special case where schools’ priority orderings are
strict. Given a strict priority structure 
 and a proﬁle R, Balinski and So¨nmez (1999)
and Ergin (2002) applied the DA-algorithm with students proposing to (
, R):3
At the ﬁrst step, every student applies to his favorite acceptable school.
For each school a, qa applicants who have the highest priority for a (all
applicants if there are fewer than qa) are placed on the waiting list of a,
and the others are rejected.
At the rth step, those applicants who were rejected at step r− 1 apply to
their next best acceptable schools. For each school a, the highest priority
qa students among the new applicants and those in the waiting list are
placed on the new waiting list and the rest are rejected.
The DA-algorithm terminates when every student is either on a waiting list or
has been rejected by every school that is acceptable to him. After this procedure
ends, schools admit the students on their waiting list, which yields the Gale-Shapley
assignment for the problem (
, R). We denote this assignment by f(R). It follows
from “pairwise stability”4 of the DA-algorithm that the Gale-Shapley assignment does
not strongly violate any priorities. It even turns out that this assignment is Pareto
superior to any other assignment which does not strongly violate any priorities.
3A more detailed discussion of the remaining part of this section can be found in Ergin (2002).
4An assignment μ is pairwise stable under (
, R) if there does not exist a pair of a school a and
a student i such that aPiμ(i) and for some j ∈ μ−1(a), i a j.
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Proposition 1 (Balinski and So¨nmez, 1999) For any strict priority structure

 and any proﬁle R,
(a) the assignment f(R) weakly respects 
, and
(b) the assignment f(R) is Pareto superior to any other assignment which weakly
respects 
.
When the priority structure 
 is strict, we denote by f the Gale-Shapley rule
taking as input the ﬁxed priority orderings of the schools. Therefore, by Proposition
1, if 
 is strict, then f is a rule which weakly respects 
.
Ergin (2002) introduced the following deﬁnition of a cycle.
Deﬁnition 3 (Ergin-cycle) Let 
 be a priority structure and q be a list of quotas.
Then 
 contains an Ergin-cycle if there are a, b ∈ A and i, j, k ∈ N such that the
following conditions are satisﬁed:
(EC) Ergin-cycle condition: i a j a k and k b i.
(ES) Ergin-scarcity condition: There exist (possibly empty) disjoint sets Na, Nb ⊆
N\{i, j, k} such that Na ⊆ Ua(j), Nb ⊆ Ub(i), |Na| = qa − 1, and Nb = qb − 1.
When 
 is strict, Ergin (2002) shows that this cycle condition is necessary and suﬃ-
cient for f to be eﬃcient or group strategy-proof or to have a consistent extension.
Theorem 1 (Ergin, 2002) Let 
 be a strict priority structure and q be a list of
quotas. The following are equivalent:
(i) f is eﬃcient.
(ii) f is group strategy-proof.
(iii) f has a consistent extension.
(iv) 
 does not contain any Ergin-cycle.
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3 The Results
When a priority structure is not strict, the DA-algorithm is not well-deﬁned: when
two students apply to a school which assigns equal priority to them, the school does
not know which student to reject. If we would try to use the DA-algorithm, we would
need to transform the (weak) priority structure into a strict priority structure. A
natural candidate for such a strict priority structure would be one in which we resolve
indiﬀerences and preserve strict preferences.5 However, as we will show, it is not
suﬃcient just to apply a ﬁxed resolution of indiﬀerences in the given priority structure.
We need to consider all possibilities of breaking ties. For any assignment problem
we will choose all Gale-Shapley assignments which are obtained from applying the
DA-algorithm to a resolution of indiﬀerences.
Formally, given two priority structures 
 and 
′, we call 
′ a strict resolution
of 
 if for all a ∈ A, (i) 
′a is strict and (ii) the strict preference of 
a is preserved
under 
′a, i.e. for all i, j ∈ N , if i a j, then i ′a j. For all proﬁles R ∈ R, let the
Gale-Shapley correspondence (with priority structure 
) F choose all assignments
obtained from applying the DA-algorithm to a strict resolution of 
 and R, i.e.
F(R) ≡ ∪′ is a strict resolution of f′(R).
Obviously there are other ways how to deﬁne a cycle than the one proposed by
Ergin (2002). We propose the deﬁnition of a weak cycle.
Deﬁnition 4 (Weak cycle) Let 
 be a priority structure and q be a list of quotas.
Then 
 contains a weak cycle if there are distinct a, b ∈ A and i, j, k ∈ N such that
the following conditions are satisﬁed:
(WC) Weak cycle condition: i 
a j 
a k and k 
b i.
(WS) Weak scarcity condition: There exist (possibly empty) disjoint sets Na, Nb ⊆
N\{i, j, k} such that Na ⊆ Wa(j), Nb ⊆ Wb(i), |Na| = qa − 1, and Nb = qb − 1.
5This is also suggested by Roth and Rothblum (1999, p.25).
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Any Ergin-cycle is a weak cycle whereas the converse is not true. For strict priority
structures the deﬁnitions of weak cycle and Ergin-cycle are equivalent. Our ﬁrst result
characterizes the priority structures which some eﬃcient rule strongly respects.6 It
generalizes Theorem 1 for rules which strongly respect an arbitrary priority structure.
Theorem 2 Let 
 be a priority structure and q be a list of quotas. The following
are equivalent:
(i) There exists an eﬃcient rule which strongly respects 
.
(ii) F is single-valued and eﬃcient.
(iii) F is single-valued and group strategy-proof.
(iv) F is single-valued and F has a consistent extension.
(v) 
 does not contain any weak cycle and for all a ∈ A, there exists i ∈ N such
that both |Wa(i)| ≤ qa and 
a |N\Wa(i) is strict.
Note that for strict priority structures (i) of Theorem 2 is superﬂuous because
by (b) of Proposition 1 the DA-algorithm is the only candidate for an eﬃcient rule
which strongly respects a strict priority structure. This is no longer true for arbitrary
priority structures 
. If we would choose a strict resolution 
′ of 
, then by Theorem
1, f
′
is eﬃcient if 
′ does not contain any Ergin-cycle. However, by Theorem 2, f′
only strongly respects 
 if the Gale-Shapley correspondence is single-valued, i.e. it
is irrelevant how we break ties in 
. If (ii) holds, then for any strict resolution 
′ of

 the rule f′ is eﬃcient and strongly respects the priority structure. Then also (iii)
and (iv) hold and f
′
is group strategy-proof and has a consistent extension.7
6All proofs are in the Appendix.
7In Theorem 2 it is not possible to add the statement “there exists a group strategy-proof rule
which strongly respects 
” because the rule which leaves all students unassigned at any proﬁle is
group strategy-proof and strongly respects 
.
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Next we focus on rules which weakly respect a priority structure. The following
result is a generalization of Proposition 1.8
Proposition 2 For any priority structure 
 and any proﬁle R,
(a) for any strict resolution 
′ of 
 the assignment f′(R) weakly respects 
, and
(b) if an assignment μ weakly respects 
 and no other assignment, which weakly
respects 
, is Pareto superior to μ, then there exists a strict resolution 
′ of 

such that f
′
(R) = μ.
Our next result characterizes the eﬃcient rules which weakly respect a priority
structure.
Deﬁnition 5 Let 
 be a priority structure.
(I) Then 
 contains a Type-I cycle if there are distinct a, b ∈ A and i, j, k ∈ N such
that the following conditions are satisﬁed:
(I-C) I-cycle condition: i ∼a j a k and both k b i and k b j.
(I-S) I-scarcity condition: There exist (possibly empty) disjoint sets Na, Nb ⊆ N\{i, j, k}
such that Na ⊆ Ua(k), Nb ⊆ Ub(i) ∩ Ub(j), |Na| = qa − 1, and |Nb| = qb − 1.
(II) Then 
 contains a Type-II cycle if there are distinct a, b, c ∈ A and i, j, k, l ∈ N
such that the following conditions are satisﬁed:
(II-C) II-cycle condition: i ∼a j a k, i ∼a j a l, and both k b i and l c j.
(II-S) II-scarcity condition: There exist (possibly empty) disjoint sets Na, Nb, Nc ⊆
N\{i, j, k, l} such that Na ⊆ Ua(k) ∩ Ua(l), Nb ⊆ Ub(i), Nc ⊆ Uc(j), |Na| = qa − 1,
|Nb| = qb − 1, and |Nc| = qc − 1.
Theorem 3 Let 
 be a priority structure, q be a list of quotas, and f be a rule. The
following are equivalent:
8Part (a) of Proposition 2 is informally described in Roth and Sotomayor (1990,p.30).
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(i) f is an eﬃcient rule which weakly respects 
.
(ii) f is an eﬃcient selection from F.
Furthermore, if (i) or (ii) hold, then 
 contains no Ergin-cycle, no Type-I cycle and
no Type-II cycle.
Theorem 3 says that for any priority structure 
 and any proﬁle R, if there exists
an eﬃcient assignment which weakly respects 
 under R, then this assignment must
be obtained from applying the DA-algorithm to a strict resolution of 
 and R.
Theorem 3 does not say that if there exists an eﬃcient rule which weakly respects

, then we can ﬁnd a strict resolution 
′ of 
 such that f′ is eﬃcient. The following
example shows that indeed this implication does not need to hold.
Example 1 (House Allocation with Existing Tenants) Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, A =
{a, b, c, d}, and qa = qb = qc = qd = 1. Let 
 be the priority structure such that

a 
b 
c 
d
1 2 3 1, 2, 3, 4
2, 3, 4 1, 3, 4 1, 2, 4
Here the existing tenants are 1, 2, and 3 (where 1 lives in a, 2 lives in b, and 3 in
c). House d is vacant and all the students have the same right on it. Then each
strict resolution of 
 contains an Ergin-cycle. Therefore, by Theorem 1, for all strict
resolutions 
′ of 
, f′ is not eﬃcient. However, applying the modiﬁed version of
Gale’s top trading cycle algorithm (where 1 owns a, 2 owns b, and 3 owns c, and say
the order in which students are allowed to choose is 1, 2, 3, and 4) by Abdulkadirog˘lu
and So¨nmez (1999) yields for each proﬁle an eﬃcient assignment. This rule is actually
a “(ﬁxed endowment) hierarchical exchange rule” (Pa´pai, 2000) with the following
endowment inheritance table (an endowment inheritance table is a strict priority
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structure)9:

′a 
′b 
′c 
′d
1 2 3 1
2 1 1 2
3 3 2 3
4 4 4 4
Note that 
′ is a strict resolution of 
. For each proﬁle, the initial endowments
are given by the ﬁrst entries in the inheritance table 
′. At Step 1 student 1 is
endowed with {a, d}, 2 with {b}, and 3 with {c}. Then we apply Gale’s top trading
cycle algorithm where each student points to his most preferred assignment. Students
belonging to a cycle are removed with their assignments and the endowments they
leave behind are reallocated according to 
′. For example, if student 1 prefers being
unassigned to being assigned to any school, then 1 leaves behind a and d. If 2 was
not assigned in the ﬁrst step, then 2 inherits a and d from 1 and at Step 2 student
2’s endowment contains a, b, and d. Then again Gale’ stop trading cycle algorithm
is applied and so on.
Since hierarchical exchange rule are group strategy-proof (Pa´pai, 2000), the rule
proposed by Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (1999) is eﬃcient, group strategy-proof, and
weakly respects 
. 
Let 
 be a priority structure. When pursuing the problem of ﬁnding eﬃcient
rules which weakly respect 
 there are two plausible approaches. The ﬁrst one is the
“Gale-Shapley approach”: we select a strict resolution 
′ of 
 and check whether f′
is eﬃcient. Here, by (a) of Proposition 2, f
′
always weakly respects 
.
The second one is the “endowment inheritance approach”: we select a strict res-
olution 
′ of 
 and check whether the hierarchical exchange rule using 
′ as the
endowment inheritance table weakly respects 
. Here the hierarchical exchange rule
using 
′ is always eﬃcient.
9We refer the reader to Example 4 in Pa´pai (2000) for a more detailed description.
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We show that neither the “Gale-Shapley approach” nor the “endowment inheri-
tance approach” successfully solve assignment problems with a weak priority struc-
ture. It is possible that there exists an eﬃcient and group strategy-proof rule which
weakly respects the priority structure although neither a DA-algorithm nor a hier-
archical exchange rule with a strict resolution of the priority structure provide an
eﬃcient rule which weakly respects the priority structure.
Theorem 4 There are priority structures 
 and lists of quotas q such that
(i) there exists no strict resolution 
′ of 
 such that f′ is eﬃcient;
(ii) there exists no strict resolution 
′ of 
 such that the hierarchical exchange rule
with endowment inheritance table 
′ weakly respects 
; and
(iii) there exists an eﬃcient and group strategy-proof rule which weakly respects 
.
We will show Theorem 4 via the following example. Let N = {1, 2, 3}, A =
{a, b, c}, and qa = qb = qc = 1. Let 
 be the priority structure such that

a 
b 
c
1, 2 2, 3 1, 3
3 1 2
In Appendix C we will propose an eﬃcient and group strategy-proof rule which weakly
respects the priority structure 
. By Theorem 3, this rule must choose for each proﬁle
a Gale-Shapley assignment which is obtained from a strict resolution of 
 and this
proﬁle. By (i) in Theorem 4, tie breaking cannot be exogenous, i.e. it is not possible
to ﬁx a priori a strict resolution 
′ of 
 and apply to each proﬁle the DA-algorithm
with ﬁxed preferences 
′. The rule we will deﬁne is a modiﬁed version of the DA-
algorithm which speciﬁes for any proﬁle a resolution of indiﬀerences. Here the main
idea is that if two students propose to the same school and they have equal priority
at that school, then the tie is broken by the priority ordering of the school to which
the third student proposes. For example, if 1 and 2 propose to school a, then we have
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1 ∼a 2 and the DA-algorithm “would not know” which student to reject. Now if 3
proposes to b, then 
b breaks the tie 1 ∼a 2 in favor of 2 and 1 is rejected by school
a. If 3 proposes to c, then 
c breaks the tie 1 ∼a 2 in favor of 1 and 2 is rejected by
school a. We refer the reader to Appendix C for a complete deﬁnition.
There are many other weak priority structures for which the “modiﬁed” DA-
algorithm is superior to the “Gale-Shapley approach” and the “endowment inheri-
tance approach”. For strict priority structures the “modiﬁed” DA-algorithm and the
DA-algorithm are identical. Furthermore by Theorem 3 there exists a speciﬁcation of
endogenous tie breaking such that the “modiﬁed” DA-algorithm and the hierarchical
exchange rule of Example 1 are identical.10
Unfortunately Theorem 2 does not remain true for rules which weakly respect a
priority structure. For instance, if an eﬃcient rule weakly respects a priority structure,
then this rule is not necessarily strategy-proof. For example, take a priority structure
where for each school a ∈ A, 
a is complete indiﬀerence over all students. Then any
eﬃcient rule weakly respects 
 but such a rule does not need to be strategy-proof.
However, if we choose an acyclic resolution of this priority structure, then by Theorem
2 and 3, the DA-algorithm applied to this resolution is an eﬃcient and strategy-proof
rule which weakly respects this priority structure.
Proposition 3 There are priority structures 
 and lists of quotas such that there
exists an eﬃcient and group strategy-proof rule which weakly respects 
 but no eﬃcient
rule, which weakly respects 
, has a consistent extension.
Proposition 3 shows in a strong sense that the relations between the properties in
Theorem 2 no longer hold for rules which weakly respect priority structure: even if
there is one which is both eﬃcient and group strategy-proof, we may not be able to
ﬁnd an eﬃcient rule which has a consistent extension.
10Here tie breaking is sequential. If two students, say 3 and 4, apply to a, then the priority
ordering of the school 1 proposes to breaks the tie. In case 1 applies to b, then 
b does not resolve
the tie 3 ∼a 4 and the priority ordering of the school 2 applies to breaks the tie. We omit the details.
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APPENDIX.
Proof of Theorem 2:
Lemma 1 Let 
 be a priority structure and f be a rule. If f strongly respects 
,
then f strongly respects any strict resolution of 
.
Proof. Let 
′ be a strict resolution of 
. Suppose that f does not strongly respect

′. Then there exist R ∈ R, i ∈ N , and a ∈ A such that f(R) weakly violates
the priority of i for a at f(R), i.e. for some j ∈ N we have fj(R) = a, aPifi(R),
and i 
′a j. Because 
′a is strict and i = j, we have i ′a j. Because 
′ is a strict
resolution of 
, it follows that
i 
a j. (1)
Since f strongly respects 
, f(R) does not weakly violate the priority of i for a at
f(R). Thus, j a i, which contradicts (1). 
We prove Theorem 2 by showing (i)⇔(ii) and (v)⇒(iv)⇒(iii)⇒(ii)⇒(v).
(i)⇒(ii): Let f be an eﬃcient rule which strongly respects 
. Let 
′ be a strict
resolution of 
. By Lemma 1, f strongly respects 
′. Thus, f is an eﬃcient rule
which strongly respects 
′. Because 
′ is strict, Deﬁnitions 1 and 2 are equivalent.
Thus, f weakly respects 
′ and Proposition 1 implies f = f′ . Since 
′ was an
arbitrary strict resolution of 
, F is single-valued and eﬃcient.
(ii)⇒(i): Let 
′ be a strict resolution of 
 and f ≡ f′ . By (ii), f is well-deﬁned
and eﬃcient. Suppose that f does not strongly respect 
. Then for some R ∈ R,
there are i ∈ N and a ∈ A such that f(R) weakly violates the priority of i for a
at f(R), i.e. for some j ∈ N , fj(R) = a, aPifi(R), and i 
a j. Let 
′′ be a strict
resolution of 
 such that i ′′a j. By (ii), f = f′ = f′′ . Because f′′ strongly
respects 
′′, this contradicts the facts that f(R) weakly violates the priority of i for
a at f(R) and f(R) = f
′′
(R).
(v)⇒(iv): Let 
′ be a strict resolution of 
. Because 
 does not contain any
weak cycle, it follows that 
′ does not contain any weak cycle. Because 
′ is strict
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and the deﬁnitions of Ergin-cycle and weak cycle are equivalent for strict priority
structures, 
′ does not contain any Ergin-cycle. Hence, by Theorem 1, f′ has a
consistent extension.
Let 
′ and 
′′ be strict resolutions of 
 and R ∈ R. Let a ∈ A. By (v) there
exists i ∈ N such that |Wa(i)| ≤ qa and 
a |N\Wa(i) is strict. Thus, 
′a |N\Wa(i) =

′′a |N\Wa(i). Because |Wa(i)| ≤ qa, each student belonging to Wa(i) is accepted by
a if he proposes to school a when applying the DA-algorithm to (
′, R) or (
′′, R).
Therefore, f
′
(R) = f
′′
(R) and F is single-valued.
(iv)⇒(iii): Let 
′ be a strict resolution of 
. By (iv), F is single-valued and
F has a consistent extension. Thus, F(R) = {f′(R)} for all R ∈ R and f′ has
a consistent extension. Hence, by Theorem 1, f
′
is group strategy-proof.
(iii)⇒(ii): Let 
′ be a strict resolution of 
. By (iii), F is single-valued and
group strategy-proof. Thus, F(R) = {f′(R)} for all R ∈ R and f′ is group
strategy-proof. Hence, by Theorem 1, f
′
is eﬃcient.
(ii)⇒(v): Suppose that 
 contains a weak cycle, i.e. there are a, b ∈ A and
i, j, k ∈ N such that i 
a j 
a k 
b i, and there exist (possibly empty) disjoint
sets Na, Nb ⊆ N\{i, j, k} such that Na ⊆ Wa(j), Nb ⊆ Wb(i), |Na| = qa − 1, and
Nb = qb−1. Let 
′ be a strict resolution of 
 such that i ′a j ′a k ′b i, Na ⊆ Ua(j),
and Nb ⊆ Ub(i). Then 
′ contains an Ergin-cycle. Hence, by Theorem 1, f′ is not
eﬃcient. Since F(R) = {f′(R)} for all R ∈ R, this contradicts (ii).
Let a ∈ A. We show that there exists i ∈ N such that |Wa(i)| ≤ qa. Let R ∈ R
be such that for all i ∈ N and all b ∈ A, aRibRii. If for all i ∈ N , |Wa(i)| > qa,
then there exist two strict resolutions 
′ and 
′′ of 
 such that f′(R) = f′′(R), a
contradiction to (ii). Similarly, it can be shown that 
a |N\Wa(i) must be strict. 
Proof of Proposition 2:
Let 
 be a priority structure and R be a proﬁle.
(a): Let 
′ be a strict resolution of 
. Suppose the assignment f′(R) does not
weakly respect 
. Then there are i ∈ N , and a ∈ A such that f′(R) strongly
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violates the priority of i for a at f
′
(R), i.e. for some j ∈ N , f′j (R) = a, aPif
′
i (R),
and i a j. Because ′a preserves a, we have i ′a j. Thus, f′(R) does not weakly
respect 
′, a contradiction to (a) of Proposition 1.
(b): Let μ be an assignment, which weakly respects 
, and no other assignment,
which weakly respects 
, is Pareto superior to μ. Let 
′ be a strict resolution of 

such that for all a ∈ A and all i, j ∈ N , if μ(j) = a, μ(i) = a, and j 
a i, then j ′a i.
We show that μ weakly respects 
′ under R.
Suppose that there exist i ∈ N and a ∈ A such that μ strongly violates the priority
of i for a at μ, i.e. for some j ∈ N , μ(j) = a, aPiμ(i), and i ′a j. Thus, μ(i) = a
and by our choice of 
′a, we must have i a j. Hence, μ does not weakly respect 

under R, a contradiction.
By (a), we know that f
′
(R) weakly respects 
. Since f′(R) is not Pareto
superior to μ and both f
′
(R) and μ weakly respect 
′, (b) of Proposition 1 implies
f
′
(R) = μ, the desired conclusion. 
Proof of Theorem 3:
(i)⇒(ii): Let f be an eﬃcient rule which weakly respects 
 and R ∈ R. By
(i), f(R) is an eﬃcient assignment which weakly respects 
 under R. Thus, by (b) of
Proposition 2, there exists a strict resolution 
′ of 
 such that f′(R) = f(R), the
desired conclusion.
(ii)⇒(i): Let R ∈ R. By (ii), there exists a strict resolution 
′ of 
 such that
f
′
(R) is eﬃcient. Deﬁne f(R) ≡ f′(R). By (a) of Proposition 2, f is an eﬃcient
rule which weakly respects 
, the desired conclusion.
Lemma 2 Let 
 be a priority structure. If (i) or (ii) hold, then 
 contains no
Ergin-cycle, no Type-I cycle and no Type-II cycle.
Proof. If 
 contains an Ergin-cycle or a Type-I cycle, then the proof is similar to
Ergin (2002) and left to the reader. Suppose that 
 has a Type-II cycle, i.e. there
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are distinct a, b, c ∈ A and i, j, k, l ∈ N such that (II-C) i ∼a j a k, i ∼a j a l,
and both k b i and l c j, and (II-S) there exist (possibly empty) disjoint sets
Na, Nb, Nc ⊆ N\{i, j, k, l} such that Na ⊆ Ua(k) ∩ Ua(l), Nb ⊆ Ub(i), Nc ⊆ Uc(j),
|Na| = qa − 1, |Nb| = qb − 1, and |Nc| = qc − 1.
We show that there exists no eﬃcient rule which weakly respects 
, i.e. neither
(i) nor (ii) hold. Suppose that f is such a rule. Let R ∈ R be such that
Ri Rj Rk Rl
b c a a
c b b c
a a
all students in Na, Nb and Nc respectively rank a, b, and c as the only acceptable
school, and all other agents prefer being not assigned to being assigned to some school.
Because |Na| = qa − 1, Na ⊆ Ua(k) ∩ Ua(l), i ∼a j a k and i ∼a j a l, we cannot
have fi(R) = i or fj(R) = j. If {fi(R), fj(R)} = {b, c}, then by eﬃciency, fi(R) = b
and fj(R) = c. Since Nb ⊆ Ub(i) and Nc ⊆ Uc(j), we have fh(R) = b for all h ∈ Nb
and fh(R) = c for all h ∈ Nc. Since |Nb| = qb − 1 and |Nc| = qc − 1, fk(R) = b, c and
fl(R) = b, c. If fk(R) = k, then k envies i and k b i, a contradiction. If fl(R) = l,
then l envies j and l c j, a contradiction. If fi(R) = a or fj(R) = a, then a Pareto
improvement is possible, a contradiction. 
Proof of Theorem 4:
Recall that N = {1, 2, 3}, A = {a, b, c}, qa = qb = qc = 1, and 
 is such that

a 
b 
c
1, 2 2, 3 1, 3
3 1 2
(i): Let 
′ be a strict resolution of 
. If 1 ′a 2, then by 3 b 1 and qa = qb = 1,
1 ′a 2 ′a 3 ′b 1 is an Ergin-cycle. If 2 ′a 1, then by 3 c 2 and qa = qc = 1,
2 ′a 1 ′a 3 ′c 2 is an Ergin-cycle. Thus, by Theorem 1, f′ is not eﬃcient.
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(ii): Let 
′ be a strict resolution of 
. We denote the (ﬁxed endowment) hierar-
chical exchange rule with endowment inheritance table 
′ by h′ . Because 
′a breaks
the ties in 
a, we have 1 ′a 2 ′a 3 or 2 ′a 1 ′a 3. Suppose 1 ′a 2 ′a 3. Because

′b breaks the ties in 
b, we have 2 ′b 3 ′b 1 or 3 ′b 2 ′b 1. Suppose 2 ′b 3 ′b 1.
Let R ∈ R be such that bP11P1aP1c, aP22P2bP2c, and bP3cP33P3a. At the ﬁrst step
of Gale’s top trading cycle algorithm, 1 points to b and 2 points to a. Thus, 1 and
2 exchange their endowments. We have h
′
1 (R) = b, h
′
2 (R) = a, and h
′
3 (R) = b.
Hence, h
′
1 (R) = b, bP3h
′
3 (R), and 3 b 1, i.e. h′(R) strongly violates the priority
of 3 for b and h
′
does not weakly respect 
.
(iii): Let R ∈ R. For all i ∈ N , we denote by t(Ri) ∈ A ∪ {i} the top ranked
assignment under Ri and by s(Ri) ∈ A ∪ {i} the second ranked assignment under
Ri. We propose the following modiﬁed DA-algorithm, denoted by h: Let R ∈ R and
N = {i, j, k}. Let 
0 be the priority ordering such that 1 0 2 0 3.
At the ﬁrst step, each student applies to his favorite school. Each school
x ∈ A places the student on the waiting list who has the highest priority
for x under 
x and the others are rejected. If two students have the same
priority under 
x, say i ∼x j, then using Rk the tie is broken as follows:
(i) if t(Rk) ∈ A\{x}, then 
t(Rk) breaks the tie i ∼x j. Note that under

t(Rk) we cannot have i ∼t(Rk) j, i.e. the tie i ∼x j is either broken in
favor of i or j.
(ii) if t(Rk) = x and s(Rk) ∈ A, then 
s(Rk) breaks the tie i ∼x j.
(iii) otherwise (this is the case when t(Rk) = k or [t(Rk) = x and s(Rk) =
k]) 
0 breaks the tie i ∼x j.
At the second step, those applicants who were rejected at Step 1 apply to
their next best acceptable schools. Each school x ∈ A places the student
on the waiting list who has the highest priority for x under 
x among the
new applicants and the student in the waiting list. If two students have
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the same priority under 
x, say i ∼x j, then 
t(Rk) breaks the tie i ∼x j.
Note that since i or j has been rejected in Step 1 and i and j apply to
the same school Step 2, we must have that in Step 1 i or j has applied to
the same school as k and t(Rk) rejected i or j.
At the third step, those applicants who were rejected at the previous step
apply to their next best acceptable schools. Each school x ∈ A places
the student on the waiting list who has the highest priority for x under

x among the new applicants and the student in the waiting list. If two
students have the same priority under 
x, say i ∼x j, then 
s(Rk) breaks
the tie i ∼x j.
At the fourth step, those applicants who were rejected at the previous
step apply to their next best acceptable schools.
The algorithm terminates when every student is either on a waiting list or has
been rejected by every school that is acceptable to him. After this procedure ends,
each school admits the student on its waiting list which yields the “modiﬁed” Gale-
Shapley assignment for the problem (
, R). We denote this assignment by h(R). We
show that the third step of h is well-deﬁned.
Lemma 3 The modiﬁed DA-algorithm h has the following property: if two students
i and j apply to school x at Step 3, then (i) student k applied to school x at Step 1
and applies to another school at Step 2, (ii) i ∼x j, and (iii) at Step 3 school x rejects
the new applicant, i.e. the tie i ∼x j is broken in favor of the student who was on the
waiting list of school x after Step 2.11
Proof. Let student i be rejected at Step 2 and apply to school c in Step 3. Suppose
that i was rejected by school b at Step 2 and school c has student j in its waiting
list after Step 2. Then we have bPicPia (if aPibPic, then i would have been rejected
11Note that Lemma 3 is not true for f
′
(where 
′ is a strict resolution of 
).
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in Steps 1 and 2 by a and b, respectively, and c cannot have a student in its waiting
list). Because school c has student j in its waiting list after Step 2, students k and i
apply to school b at Step 2. By bPicPia, we must have that j and k apply to school c
in Step 1 and c rejects k. Thus, t(Rj) = t(Rk) = c, s(Rk) = t(Ri) = b, and s(Ri) = c.
In particular (i) is true for student k.
Case 1: {j, k} = {1, 2}.
Since school c rejects k at Step 1 and 1 c 2, we must have j = 1 and k = 2.
Then at Step 2, students 2 and 3 apply to b. Since 2 ∼b 3 and t(R1) = c, 
c breaks
the tie 2 ∼b 3. Hence, by 3 c 2, 2 is rejected by school b. This contradicts the fact
that i = 3 is rejected at Step 2.
Case 2: {j, k} = {2, 3}.
Since school c rejects k at Step 1 and 3 c 2, we must have j = 3 and k = 2.
Then at Step 2, students 1 and 2 apply to b. Hence, by 2 b 1, 1 is rejected by school
b. Then by bPicPia and i = 1, at Step 3 student 1 applies to school c and student 3
is on the waiting list of school c after Step 2. Because t(R2) = c and s(R2) = b, 
b
breaks the tie 1 ∼c 3 in favor of 3 and student i = 1 is rejected by school c at Step 3.
Hence, (ii) and (iii) are true.
Case 3: {j, k} = {1, 3}.
Since at Step 1 students 1 and 3 apply to school c and t(R2) = b, 
b breaks the
tie 1 ∼c 3 in favor of 3. Because school c rejects k at Step 1, we must have j = 3 and
k = 1. Then at Step 2, students 1 and 2 apply to b. Hence, by 2 b 1, 1 is rejected
by school b. This contradicts the fact that i = 2 is rejected at Step 2. 
Theorem 3 and the following lemma show that h is an eﬃcient rule which weakly
respects 
.
Lemma 4 The modiﬁed DA-algorithm h is an eﬃcient selection from F.
Proof. Let R ∈ R. By deﬁnition of the modiﬁed DA-algorithm, there exists a strict
resolution 
′ of 
 such that h(R) = f′(R).
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Suppose that h(R) is not eﬃcient. By Theorem 2.27 in Roth and Sotomayor
(1990), f
′
(R) is weakly eﬃcient.12 Thus, by h(R) = f
′
(R), there exist two stu-
dents, say i and j (where N = {i, j, k}), who would like to exchange their assignments
under h(R). Then under the modiﬁed DA-algorithm i must have applied to hj(R)
and was rejected by hj(R), and j must have applied to hi(R) and was rejected by
hi(R). It is impossible that i was rejected by hj(R) because j applied to hj(R) and
j was rejected by hi(R) because i applied to hi(R). Hence, either i was rejected by
hj(R) because k applied to hj(R) or j was rejected by hi(R) because k applied to
hi(R). Therefore, when applying the modiﬁed DA-algorithm h to R, there are at
least three rejections. This means that at Step 3 student k is rejected and k belonged
to the waiting list of a school after Step 2, which contradicts Lemma 3. 
The following lemma completes the proof of Theorem 4.
Lemma 5 The modiﬁed DA-algorithm h is group strategy-proof.
Proof. Let R ∈ R. If there is a unique eﬃcient assignment under R, then for
all i ∈ N , hi(R) = t(Ri) and no group of students can gain by manipulation. Let
M ⊆ N and R′ ≡ (R′M , RN\M). Suppose that all students belonging to M weakly
prefer h(R′) to h(R) with strict preference holding for some student in M . Because
h(R) is eﬃcient, we have M = N . Since there are at least two eﬃcient assignments
under R, there are at least two students who have the same school top-ranked.
Let i ∈ N be such that t(Ri) ∈ A and at least one other student has also t(Ri)
top-ranked under R. By deﬁnition of h and Lemma 3, one of the students who applies
to t(Ri) at the ﬁrst step is assigned to t(Ri) under h(R) (if two students apply to
school t(Ri) at Step 3, then school t(Ri) keeps the student who was on its waiting
list after Step 2). Without loss of generality, let hi(R) = ti(R). Obviously i cannot
gain by misrepresentation. We next show that i /∈ M . If i ∈ M , then hi(R′) = hi(R).
12Weak eﬃciency means that there is no assignment μ such that all students strictly prefer μ to
f
′
(R).
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Thus, by Lemma 3, either t(R′i) = t(Ri) or [t(R
′
i) ∈ A\{t(Ri)}, i is rejected by t(R′i)
at the ﬁrst step, and s(R′i) = t(Ri)]. By hi(R
′) = hi(R), in both cases under Ri and
R′i ties are broken in the same way when applying the modiﬁed DA-algorithm to R
and R′. Hence, i /∈ M .
If hi(R) = hi(R
′) and R′i = Ri, then by deﬁnition of h and Lemma 3, under R
′ we
cannot have that M gains by joint manipulation. Thus, hi(R
′) = hi(R). Let j ∈ N
be such that hj(R
′) = t(Ri). Because hi(R) = t(Ri) and at least one other student
has t(Ri) top-ranked under R, i cannot be the student at the bottom of the priority
ordering 
t(Ri). Therefore, i 
t(Ri) j. Because hj(R′) = t(Ri) and R′i = Ri, we also
have j 
t(Ri) i. Thus, i ∼t(Ri) j. Furthermore, by Lemma 3, R′j must be such that
either j applies to t(Ri) at the ﬁrst step or j and k apply to the same school at the
ﬁrst step and j is rejected and applies to t(Ri) at the second step.
First suppose t(R′j) = t(Ri). Then the tie i ∼t(Ri) j is broken according to (i), (ii),
or (iii) in the ﬁrst step of the modiﬁed DA-algorithm. If under R′ the tie i ∼t(Ri) j
is broken according to 
0, then hk(R′) = k. Since hi(R) = t(Ri), under R the tie
i ∼t(Ri) j cannot be broken according to 
0 and R′k = Rk. But then hk(R) = k and
hk(R)Pkk, which is a contradiction to R
′
k = Rk and thus, k ∈ M . Similarly, if under
R′ the tie i ∼t(Ri) j is broken according to 
x where x ∈ A\{t(Ri)}, then hk(R′) = x.
Since hi(R) = t(Ri), under R the tie i ∼t(Ri) j cannot be broken according to 
x and
R′k = Rk. But then hk(R) = x and hk(R)Pkx, which is a contradiction to R′k = Rk
and thus, k ∈ M .
Second suppose that t(R′j) = t(R
′
k) ∈ A\{t(Ri)}, j is rejected by t(R′k), and
s(R′j) = t(Ri). If k t(R′k) j, then at the second step 
t(R′k) breaks the tie i ∼t(Ri) j in
favor of i, a contradiction. Thus, k ∼t(R′k) j. Since j is rejected by t(R′k) under R′, we
have hk(R
′) = t(R′k). Since hi(R) = t(Ri), under R the tie i ∼t(Ri) j cannot be broken
according to
t(R′k) and R′k = Rk. But then hk(R) = hk(R′) and hk(R)Pkhk(R′), which
is a contradiction to R′k = Rk and thus, k ∈ M . 
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Proof of Proposition 3:
Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, A = {a, b, c}, qa = qb = qc = 1, and 
 is such that

a 
b 
c
4 4 4
1, 2 2, 3 1, 3
3 1 2
It is straightforward to adjust the proof of Theorem 4 and its modiﬁed DA-algorithm
to 
. Hence, the modiﬁed DA-algorithm is an eﬃcient and group strategy-proof rule
which weakly respects 
. Let f be an eﬃcient rule which weakly respects 
. We
show f does not have a consistent extension. Let
R1 R2 R3 R4 R
′
4
b c a c a
c b b 4 4
a a c b b
1 2 3 a c
where R = (R1, R2, R3, R4) and R
′ = (R{1,2,3}, R′4). Because f weakly respects 
 and
4 has highest priority at each school, we have both f4(R) = c and f4(R
′) = a.
If f3(R) = b, then f(R) is not eﬃcient, a contradiction. Thus, by f4(R) = c
and both 1 and 2 have higher priority at school a than 3, we have f1(R) = 1 and
f2(R) = 2. Since f weakly respects 
, it follows f1(R) = a, f2(R) = b, and f3(R) = 3.
Similarly, if f2(R
′) = b, then f(R′) is not eﬃcient, a contradiction. Thus, by
f4(R
′) = a and both 1 and 3 have higher priority at school c than 2, we have f1(R′) = 1
and f3(R
′) = 3. Since f weakly respects 
, it follows f1(R′) = c, f2(R′) = 0, and
f3(R
′) = b.
Now we have {f1(R), f4(R)} = {a, c} = {f1(R′), f4(R′)} and R{2,3} = R′{2,3}.
However, f2(R) = b = 2 = f2(R′) and f does not have a consistent extension. 
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